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Highlights
Carbon emissions in the S&P500 for the period 2008 to 2014 have not been reduced.
Carbon intensive business models present a threat to financial stability from ‘stranded 
assets’ and ‘carbon bubbles’.
Financial institutions should migrate investment portfolios away from carbon intensive 
business models.
We find that for the S&P313 group of companies financial institutions are increasing 
investment in carbon intensive business models. 
Carbon intensive business models are conjoined to less carbon intensive business models 
which generate substantial financial leverage.
Financial institutions will need to invest innovatively to support the decarbonising of 
upstream carbon intensive business to sustain the financial viability of less carbon 
dependent but highly capitalized downstream business models. 
21. Introduction
Since signing the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 international climate conferences such as Montreal 
2005, Copenhagen 2009 and Paris 2015 national governments have moved towards setting 
long-term goals to control the increase in Greenhouse Gas Emissions (GHG) and their carbon 
equivalent to levels that are designed to arrest the increase in global average temperatures 
to levels that are below 2°C above pre-industrial levels. At the Paris climate conference 
(COP21) in December 2015 Governments agreed:
a long-term goal of keeping the increase in global average temperature to well below 
2°C above pre-industrial levels; to aim to limit the increase to 1.5°C, since this would 
significantly reduce risks and the impacts of climate change; on the need for global 
emissions to peak as soon as possible, recognising that this will take longer for 
developing countries; to undertake rapid reductions thereafter in accordance with the 
best available science (European Commission, 2018a).
According to a carbon footprint briefing note issued by ShareAction and TruCost, ‘global 
emissions would have to fall by about 60% by 2050 to limit the increase in average 
temperature to less than 2°C (3.6°F) above pre-industrial levels. Over the last 40 years, CO2 
emissions have continually risen and only stalling following major economic crises.’ 
(ShareAction and Trucost, 2015). 
Table 1 reveals that, although carbon emissions intensity has fallen from 0.48 tons of carbon 
per $1000 of global GDP in 1990 to 0.32 tons in 2016, it is that case that GDP has grown at a 
faster rate thereby increasing overall global emissions from 22 billion to 36 billion tons of 
carbon equivalent emissions annually. The world’s major industrial and industrialising 
economies have not found a way of decoupling carbon emissions from economic growth and 
carbon emission concentrations in the atmosphere have increased from 355 to over 400 parts 
per million. 
Table 1: Global carbon emissions in relation to GDP and atmospheric concentrations
1990 2000 2010 2016
Tons of carbon /1000$ of GDP 0.48 0.41 0.37 0.32
Total CO2 emissions bill tons 22.5 25.6 33.6 35.8
CO2 parts per mill in atmosphere 355.0 370.6 388.7 402.5
Sources: For carbon emissions parts per million in atmosphere as at Jan 1st of these years
(Tans et al., 2018). For data on total global carbon emissions in relation to GDP
(European Commission, 2017a)
Since the Kyoto Protocol was signed in 1997 the idea that a top down legalistic regulatory 
model would provide the authority to establish a unified global political commitment to 
reducing carbon emissions has been progressively undermined and global carbon emissions 
3continue to increased. Rather than a top down legal and regulatory approach attention is now 
focussing on contribution of financial markets and financial institutions. Specifically, how 
financial markets or governing financial institutions could be employed to modify corporate 
behaviour and decarbonise economic development. This approach is now being advocated by 
the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and European Commission (EC). New 
financial markets such as carbon cap and trade have been tested out in Europe and to some 
extent to US but with limited impact on carbon emissions. The broader alternative, and which 
is the focus of this paper, is the contribution of financial institutions (FIs) and how their power 
over capital allocations (debt and equity) could promote decarbonisation. FI’s could 
progressively direct capital from more to less carbon intensive business models because there 
is a risk attached to investing in carbon intensive activities. Carbon intensive business activity 
could, for example, be subjected to adverse regulatory and technical changes that could lead 
to ‘stranded assets’ or a ‘carbon bubble’ that would put invested capital at risk.
Whilst there has been a steady increase in our understanding of climate change from a 
scientific-environmental risk perspective, for example, the increase in volatile climatic events 
(Sneed, 2017), the challenge has been to translate this understanding of risk into meaningful 
behavioural changes within corporations. Specifically this would involve companies that are 
carbon intensive moving on to a less carbon intensive trajectory so as to secure absolute 
reductions in global carbon emissions. Connecting the science of climate risk arising from 
carbon emissions to changes in corporate behaviour is, as we have noted, not an easy task 
but recent policies have centred on encouraging new financial markets to trade in carbon off-
set credits and of encouraging financial institutions (FIs) to change their asset allocation 
behaviour away from more to less carbon intensive investment portfolios. 
With regards to financial market interventions the European Union Emissions Trading System 
(EUETS), the world’s largest carbon cap and trade system, was launched in 2005 and the UK 
Government believed that: 
The EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), the world’s largest cap and trade system, 
should remain the cornerstone of EU energy and climate change policy. The EU ETS 
demonstrates Europe’s ambition to act as a global leader in the fight against climate 
change through the delivery of a functional and effective carbon market. The 
continued success of EU ETS is vital in helping the EU to meet its 2030 and 2050 targets 
at least cost, and in laying the foundations of a global carbon market (United Kingdom 
Government, 2014)
The EU ETS operates on the basis of what is termed a ‘cap and trade’ principle. Within the EU 
a target is set for the overall volume of greenhouse gases that can be emitted by energy power 
plants, industry and other sectors covered by a cap on carbon emissions set at EU level. Within 
this overall cap some companies may be under target and so obtain allowances which they 
can trade with other companies/sectors that are above their targets (European Commission, 
2016) 
4Chart 1: Trading price of carbon on European ETS 
Source: MacDonald (2016)  
Chart 1 reveals that the price of carbon traded is volatile and peaked at 30 Euro before falling 
into a range of 3-5 Euro. A fundamental problem is that this cap and trade trading system has 
failed to impose meaningful caps on the emissions of Europe’s most carbon-intensive 
industries (Friends of the Earth Europe, 2010).  In addition and according to a Sandbag report 
(2017): 
The EU ETS has hit a new record of 3 billion tonnes of surplus EUAs, including both 
volumes available to the market and those destined for the MSR (Market Stability 
Reserve). This record surplus and accompanying low carbon prices suggests that the 
EU ETS has failed as a policy (Sandbag, 2017).
A research report produced by the Grantham Institute for climate change is more positive but 
finds that it is difficult to separate out the impact of the ETS market for carbon and the 
recession in Europe which also contributed to reducing emissions (Muûls et al., 2016). 
However, according to the European Commission climate action website the surplus of 
trading credits risks is undermining the orderly functioning of the carbon market. In the longer 
term it could affect the ability of the ETS to meet more demanding emission reduction targets 
cost-effectively  (European Commission, 2018b).
The lack of support for the EU ETS is nicely summed up in a recent European Commission 
(2017b) report which observes that there is a considerable gap between the shadow price for 
carbon emissions employed by the European Investment bank (EIB) of €32/tCO2 and so-called 
market price of less than €5 euro. This low ‘price’ for carbon emissions obscures the 
difference between assets that are carbon efficient and those which are not.
The absence of a financially material carbon price prevents investors from 
differentiating carbon-intensive assets from carbon-efficient assets in their economic 
reasoning. The EU emissions trading system (ETS) price of carbon for a DEC17 EUA is 
5currently about €5. The EIB, by comparison, uses a shadow cost of carbon of €32/tCO2 
today, rising €1 each year to €45/ tCO2 in 2030 (European Commission, 2017b: p.42)
In the US one of the most enduring cap-and-trade carbon off-set markets is the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), operating in nine Northeastern states: Connecticut, 
Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and 
Vermont. These states collectively obtain revenue from the auction of carbon credits but 
according to a 2016 report from the Congressional Research Service (CRS) found that, as a 
group, the total CO2 emissions from the nine RGGI states account for approximately 7% of 
U.S. CO2 emissions (and 16% of U.S. gross domestic product). RGGI’s aggregate emissions rank 
in the top 20 among all nations. But from a practical standpoint, the RGGI programmes 
contribution to directly reducing the global accumulation of GHG emissions in the atmosphere 
is arguably negligible (Congressional Research Service, 2017). Although states such as 
California’s cap and trade scheme covers about 85% of emissions in the state and is designed 
to reduce emissions to 1990 levels by 2020 it too seems not to have impacted on aggregate 
emissions (St-Louis & Millard-Ball, 2015)
The alternative to a ‘market’ based cap and trade approach to reducing carbon emissions 
would involve encouraging Financial Institutions (FIs) to modify their investment behaviour, 
that is, allocate capital away from more to less carbon intensive portfolios. And, it is with this 
approach to decarbonisation, and how this is framed, that informs the basis of this article. 
Specifically, it is argued that a change in investment strategy by FIs is required, that is, carbon 
intensive assets present increased value at risk due to possible changes in regulation and 
threats from new technology. These changes could limit the extraction and use of carbon and 
hence damage the return on capital for the FIs that have positions in these business models. 
This might then lead on to FIs facing exposure from so-called ‘stranded assets’ or a ‘carbon 
bubble’ (see WRI-UNEP, 2015, European Commission, 2017b).
For example, if a large quantity of fossil fuel resources cannot be extracted and used to 
produce energy (whether because of policy, market or other carbon-related constraints), 
companies whose business is principally focused on such activities could be negatively 
impacted, both operationally and financially. The implications for fossil fuel commodity prices 
are crucial in any asset valuation scenario for such companies. This concept is referred to as 
‘operator carbon risk’ and affects carbon-intensive companies and asset operators. Further, 
this possibility of value at risk from carbon intensive asset classes has led to a broader 
discussion about whether financial intermediaries, such as commercial and investment banks, 
and broader investors, are thoroughly integrating considerations of operator carbon risk 
when evaluating, pricing, and financing carbon intensive assets and companies (Fulton & 
Weber, 2012)
For example, the Carbon Tracker Initiative reviews the extent to which meeting a 2°C global 
warming target would render some energy assets at risk because extracting reserves would 
prove to be uneconomic.
6Investors have recognised the value of companies considering a range of scenarios, 
including a 2°C scenario, by supporting initiatives and resolutions which ask companies 
to report on the implications of this future for their business….. Mark Carney, the 
FSB(Financial Stability Board) chair stated that a carbon budget consistent with a 2°C 
target “would render the vast majority of reserves ‘stranded’ — oil, gas and coal that 
will be literally un-burnable without expensive carbon capture technology, which itself 
alters fossil fuel economics” (Carbon Tracker, 2017).
Whilst a European Commission sponsored report suggests that while Europe’s investors have 
been leading the decarbonisation of investment portfolios, the combined exposure of their 
equity portfolio to carbon-intensive sectors remains large [45-47%] (European Commission, 
2017b). In contrast the concern, expressed by others, is that carbon risk may not be modifying 
investor and analyst’s behaviour in a way that progressively mitigates climate change risk 
(Campbell & Slack, 2011; Harmes, 2011; Pattberg, 2012) and that this delay could lead to a 
so-called ‘carbon bubble’ effect.
The carbon bubble poses risks to the financial sector because financial institutions 
have large exposures to oil, gas and coal mining companies through equity, bond, and 
loan portfolios (Weyzig et al., 2014)
The prospect of a ‘carbon bubble shock’ or ‘stranded asset values’ relates to the volatility and 
extent of valuation changes if carbon intensive sectors are not able to extract and utilise 
carbon so as to generate a financial return on capital invested. The WRI-UNEP-commissioned 
report ‘Carbon Asset Risk’ observes that industry sectors that rely on high levels of carbon 
emissions, such as those involved in energy supply and materials extraction and processing, 
may find that their carbon reserves cannot be employed ‘whether because of policy, market, 
or other carbon-related constraints’ (WRI-UNEP, 2015:6). This will have a negative impact on 
the valuation of these sectors and this has led on to a broader debate about whether financial 
institutions are taking into account carbon risk in the allocation of their capital stack, that is 
debt and equity positions. 
Al Gore in a Wall Street Journal article noted that ‘this is exactly what is happening with the 
sub-prime carbon asset bubble: It is still growing because most market participants are 
mistakenly treating carbon risk as an uncertainty, and are thus failing to incorporate it in 
investment analyses. By overlooking a known material-risk factor, investors are exposing their 
portfolios to an externality that should be integrated into the capital allocation process (Gore 
& Blood, 2013). Policy responses that are required to comply with a 2° rise in global average 
temperatures would impact negatively on sectors that rely upon the extraction of and burning 
of carbon to generate energy. According to Comerford and Spiganti (2015) ‘It is not only the 
equity of companies that is exposed to this, the quality of the debt they have issued is also 
exposed and there will be defaults and ratings downgrades’ (Comerford & Spiganti, 2015: p.3)
7According to Ritchie & Dowlatabadi, (2015) the idea of a carbon bubble has not only gained 
traction in financial markets but investors are now ‘incorporating stranded asset risk’ into 
their outlooks. It is argued that a growing number of institutions are committing to divest 
from carbon intensive industry sectors to avoid a carbon bubble. The possibility of a carbon 
bubble and how it might force investors to divesting these assets is regularly cited by climate 
campaigners as being of a benefit to society (Ritchie & Dowlatabadi, 2015: p.60). Moreover, 
incorporating carbon risk into portfolio allocations might encourage a more rapid exit from 
carbon intensive business models. For example, John Fullerton, a former managing director 
at JP Morgan is reported as stating that the market value of 2,795 gigatons of carbon missions 
are worth about $27 trillion and if 80 per cent of it were to be kept underground, you’d be 
writing off $20 trillion in assets (McKibben, 2012).
Dieter Helm (2015) has alternatively argued that that this notion of ‘stranded assets’ and 
‘asset bubble’ from carbon risk is deceptively too simple and argues that what matters is the 
price of oil, gas and coal and how prices coupled to a discount rate impact on the valuation of 
a reporting entity’s assets. Helm observes that:
The great mistake the stranded asset lobby make is to believe that they have come up 
with a way to mobilise private investors and institutions to do the decarbonisation for 
them. They think that disinvestment will be a profit maximising strategy. Hence their 
job is to educate private investors as to how best to make more money. In the process 
they anticipate that the cost of capital to fossil fuel companies will go up, hence 
starving them of investment (Helm, 2015).
Dieter Helm makes an important observation about constructing an understanding of carbon-
financial risk using concepts such as stranded assets’ and/or a ‘carbon bubble’. This, Helm 
argues, is rather too simple an understanding about how carbon emissions intensity informs 
the costs of capital (risk) and thereby capital allocation(s) and return on capital for investors. 
In this paper we agree with Helm’s observation about the framing being rather too simple. To 
set about constructing a more sophisticated critical argument about carbon emissions and 
financial risk we set up two key questions to be answered. Firstly have financial institutions 
reduced their capital stacks (debt and equity) in more carbon intensive business models in 
the S&P500? Secondly, would a disorderly retreat of capital from carbon intensive business 
models make financial sense in the context of wider interconnectedness between business 
models within value chains? 
In this paper we employ carbon emissions data disclosed by the Carbon Disclosure Project 
(CDP) for the S&P 500 group of companies and match these emissions data with reported 
revenues, earnings, and capitalisation. Using these matched carbon and financial data for 
firms listed in the S&P 500 over the period 2008 to 2014, we can then engage with two key 
questions we have set for our analysis: are ‘financial institutions’ re-allocating capital away 
from carbon emissions-intensive sectors to less intensive sectors? And, secondly, is it possible 
8to re-frame carbon-asset risk into a more nuanced understanding of business models that are 
embedded in a more complex physical and financial value chain than that presented by the 
protagonists of: stranded assets or carbon bubble?      
Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England, observed in 2015 that: 
An old adage is that which is measured can be managed [and] information about the 
carbon intensity of investments allows investors to assess risks to companies’ business 
models and to express their views in the market’ (Carney, 2015: p.12). 
And in the same speech Carney observes that how carbon emissions are measured should be 
consistent - in scope and objective across the relevant industries and sectors (Carney, 2015).  
There is also the additional challenge that what is measured and disclosed by companies 
about their carbon emissions may also change over a period of time because, as Lohmann 
(2009) observes, there are considerable problems controlling the boundary of a company 
(Haslam et al, 2014). Whilst there are additional problems associated with encouraging 
disclosures (de Aguiar & Bebbington, 2014) if these are voluntary rather than a regulatory 
obligation. 
There are considerable challenges and health warnings attached to translating carbon arising 
from different greenhouse gases into a company based measure (Andrew & Cortese, 2011). 
For the purpose of the investigation about carbon-asset risk in the S&P 500 constituent group 
of companies we employ information on carbon emissions collected by CDP, formerly known 
as the Carbon Disclosure Project. CDP supports companies in terms of technical advice on 
how to measure their GHG emissions and how to convert these into a C02 equivalent. CDP 
collects C02 equivalent data from companies and these are allocated into what are known as 
Scope 1, 2 and 3 emissions categories. Scope 1 carbon emissions are from operations that are 
owned or controlled by the reporting company whilst scope 2 emissions are indirect 
emissions from the generation of purchased or acquired electricity, steam, heat or cooling 
consumed by the reporting company. Scope 3 emissions include upstream and downstream 
value chain emissions and are an optional reporting category in the Corporate Standard 
(World Resources Institute & World Business Council for Sustainable Development, 2001). In 
this paper we have obtained S&P 500 group company disclosures for their scope 1 and 2 
carbon emissions and identify 313 companies out of the S&P 500 that disclose carbon 
emissions and matching key financial operating data over the period from 2008 to 2014.
In the following section we review the trajectory of US carbon emissions at an aggregate level 
and across key industry sectors before turning to review carbon-financial performance of 
business models in the S&P 500 group of 313 companies
9 2. Accounting for US Carbon emissions
The direction for aggregate global carbon emissions has consistently been on an upwards 
trajectory and in an earlier period the trend added an additional 3-4 billion tonnes of carbon 
dioxide emissions every 10 years carbon emissions this has accelerated in recent decades with 
aggregate C02 emissions increasing at the rate of 8 billion tonnes over the period 2000-2010. 
And, in just 4 years from 2010-14, the global increase has been an additional 3 billion tonnes. 
A major driver of this growth in carbon emissions has been that arising from China’s rapid 
economic growth which has added 6 billion tons to annual global carbon emissions since the 
year 2000. In contrast data for US and EU carbon emissions reveals slight reductions in recent 
years, for example, since 2008 the US reported carbon emissions are down roughly 6 percent. 
Source: The World Bank (2018)
If we break down the analysis of CO2 emissions by economic/industry sector we find that 
whilst shares remain quite steady it is the case that roughly 80 percent of carbon emissions 
are from three industry sectors: electricity generation, transportation and industry. However 
there are limitations attached to measuring and reporting carbon emissions using industry 
sectors as the unit of analysis. One problem is that economic sectors are not made up of firms 
but establishments and another challenge is that the legal reporting/disclosure unit of 
analysis for carbon emissions are company’s not individual firms.
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Table 2: US Economic sector share of carbon emissions 1990 to 2014
Economic Sector 1990 2000 2010 2014
Electricity generation 29.2 32.2 32.9 30.3
Transportation 24.2 26.5 26.2 26.3
Industry 25.3 21.8 20.0 21.3
Agriculture 8.8 8.0 9.0 9.1
Commercial 6.5 5.6 6.1 6.6
Residential 5.4 5.3 5.2 5.7
U.S. territories 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: WorldAtlas (2017)
The motivation for locating economic activity into a system of industrial classification is one 
that is driven by ‘economists’ and their need to understand how the structure of an economy 
is evolving and how this informs policy initiatives.
A good classification system ...need(s) to reflect the current structure of the economy 
in order to assist analysis of important changes. … It is often remarked that the 
structure of the economy provides a kind of snapshot view of the economy at one 
time, which implies that times series will show how the structure changes’   (Economic 
Classification Policy Committee, 1993. p.16991)
There have been a number of general criticisms about locating economic activity into industry 
classifications and using these to then describe the structure of the economy. The first of 
these relates to the way in which the firm, as a unit of account, is deconstructed into its 
‘establishments’ which are then classified into an industry sector. These establishments are 
located into an industry sector using information about their ‘dominant’ or primary supply-
side characteristics. This process of deconstructing the firm into establishments erases the 
identity of the firm.
An establishment is classified to an industry when its primary activity meets the 
definition for that industry. Because establishments may perform more than one 
activity, it is necessary to determine procedures for identifying the primary activity 
of the establishment (United States, Office of Budget Management, 1999).
A second problem with this process of classification concerns the use of the supply-side 
characteristics alone to locate establishments into an industry sector because this loses the 
identity of outputs and demand side characteristics.
In this paper we employ information using companies listed in the S&P 500 and here there is 
a different twist on how reporting entities rather than enterprises are allocated to industry 
sectors. The S&P 500 constituent list employs the S&P500/MSCI Global Industry Classification 
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Standard (GICS) classification assigns companies to a single GICS sub-industry ‘according to 
the definition of its principal business activity as determined by Standard & Poor's and MSCI. 
Revenues and earnings are a significant factor in defining principal business activity’ (Morgan 
Stanley Capital International & Standard and Poor’s, 2012)
A company is assigned a classification at each of the four levels of GICS; however, a 
company may only belong to one group at any level. The classification is generally 
determined by the business activity that generates a majority of the company’s revenues 
and/or earnings.
The S&P methodology for locating companies into an industry integrates into its methodology 
a market-oriented perspective which takes into account that production and services are 
comingled within companies. 
The GICS methodology for defining industries remains profoundly rooted in the 
microstructure of industries, but has shifted towards a market-oriented perspective. For 
example, in today’s economy, drawing the line between goods and services is increasingly 
difficult and arbitrary, as almost all goods are sold with a service. Thus, the distinction 
between consumer goods and services has been replaced by the more market-oriented 
sectors of “Consumer Discretionary” and “Consumer Staples” which both contain goods 
and services sub-industries (Morgan Stanley Capital International & Standard and Poor’s, 
2012)
Companies are classified into their respective industry sector using their annual reports and 
financial statements but other sources of information including investment research reports 
and other industry information are also employed to support classification. The S&P 500 GICS 
methodology for allocating companies into industry sectors employs material financials 
(revenues and earnings) to allocate a company to an industry sector. It is also a more flexible 
and adaptive approach because new GICS can be created if and when a group of companies 
have significantly different activity characteristics but also material sales and earnings profiles 
that can be employed to locate these firms into the new industry sector classification. 
Using the company as the unit of analysis is significant for two reasons the first of these is 
that the carbon emissions disclosed by a company transcend industry sectors. For example, 
General Motors (the company) manufactures cars and components, but also provides 
financial services and invests in car retailing and distribution networks all of which contribute 
to its carbon emissions profile as scope 1 and 2 disclosures. The second benefit of using 
companies as the unit of analysis is that, as reporting entities, they will disclose operating 
financials, balance sheet assets and liabilities and be given market valuations by analysts. 
These financial dimensions of a reporting entity will have a corresponding physical carbon 
emissions disclosure.  
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2.1 Carbon emissions intensity in the S&P 500 
Our analysis focuses on 313 companies listed in the S&P 500 constituent list for which we 
have disclosed carbon emissions and also matching financial data for the period 2008 to 2014. 
Some of the S&P 500 group listed in 2008 will not be listed continuously during the period 
2008 up to 2014 due to mergers and acquisitions or a company previously listed may 
alternatively have gone into insolvency and bankruptcy.
Table 3: Carbon emissions S&P 313 2008 to 2014
Carbon emissions bill tons
2008 2.05
2009 2.06
2010 2.07
2011 2.13
2012 2.07
2013 2.09
2014 2.04
Source: CDP public datasets (https://data.cdp.net/browse) and also authors’ own investigations. 
Table 3 reveals that for the period 2008 to 2014 this group of 313 firms consistently disclosing 
their carbon emissions and listed in the S&P500 constituent list have not managed to reduce 
their overall carbon emissions. This group of companies accounts for 2 billion tons of carbon 
emissions on an annual basis and this is equivalent to roughly 40 percent of aggregate US 
carbon emissions (see chart 2). For this group of companies the amount of sales revenue and 
cash earnings extracted from one tonne of carbon has increased by 20 percent and 60 percent 
respectively. However, the amount of capital employed (debt and equity) relative to carbon 
emissions for this group of 313 companies increased by roughly 25 percent. For the average 
company in the S&P313 group the amount of carbon required to generate earnings has 
reduced but capital employed relative to carbon emissions increased.  
2.2 Mapping carbon emissions and capital intensity in the S&P 500
In this section we split our analysis of the S&P313 group of firms into carbon intensive 
‘generating’ business models and those that we describe as carbon ‘dependent’ business 
models. This analysis is employed to first investigate the extent to which investors have 
migrated their capital stack (debt and equity) from carbon intensive business models over the 
period 2008 to 2014. And secondly to construct an alternative understanding about carbon 
‘generating’ and carbon ‘dependent’ business models within a more complex physical and 
financial value chain.       
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Using the S&P313 group of companies we split these into a range of business models: Energy 
Utility, Materials Processing, Materials Extractive and all others. This framing is employed to 
broadly set out a value chain that maps out business models that are carbon generators and 
those that are carbon dependent. Although we note that these defining arrangement not 
represent clear boundaries because some materials extractive and processing companies will 
have invested in their own power-plant capacity. Figure 1 below describes the carbon value 
chain using the concept of carbon generating and carbon dependent business models.
 
Source: Authors
Notes: the shares of carbon emissions are the average for all companies in these business models 
covering the period 2008 to 2014
In the middle of figure 1 we have the energy utilities that supply energy from converting 
different types of input from coal, nuclear, oil, gas and renewables. Our flow diagram 
indicates that the materials processing and energy extractive business models are carbon 
dependent in terms of requiring energy supply. However these business models may also 
have invested in their own power plants that generate carbon emissions. On the right we have 
all other predominantly carbon dependent business models that use energy plus also require 
inputs from the materials processing and to some extent energy extractive business models. 
The purpose of figure 1 is to broadly separate out business models that are carbon generators 
and carbon dependent and to estimate their share of total carbon emissions in the S&P313 
group of companies.
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The framework presented in figure 1 is a physical carbon emissions representation of the 
value chain and this can be supplemented by including: operating and balance sheet financials 
for these business models which contain allocated companies. In figure 2 we reproduce the 
physical share of carbon emissions by business model but add in to the analysis their share of 
capital employed1.
 
Source: Authors
Notes: the shares of carbon emissions are the average for all companies in these business models 
covering the period 2008 to 2014. Capital employed is: Short and Long-run debt plus total shareholder 
equity which is paid in capital, additional capital paid in and retained earnings reserves after 
adjustments for changes in comprehensive income.
When then share of capital employed is included, for the various carbon generating and 
dependent business models, we find that the carbon intensive business models: energy 
utilities, materials processing and energy extractive account for approximately 80 percent of 
carbon emissions but just 16 percent of capital employed (debt and equity). All other business 
models to the right in figure 2 account for roughly 20 percent of carbon emissions but 84 
percent of capital employed.
However, over a period of time (2008 to 2014) we find that financial institutions do continue 
to provide increasing amounts of capital (as debt and equity) to carbon intensive business 
models in the S&P 500 although the absolute increase in funding is less than that provided to 
other less carbon intensive business models (see Table 4). During this period the increase in 
1 Capital employed is: Short and Long-run debt plus total shareholder equity which is paid in capital, additional 
capital paid in and retained earnings reserves after adjustments for changes in comprehensive income.
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capital employed in carbon intensive business models increased by $0.7 trillion and in the less 
carbon intensive business models it is roughly $2 trillion. Our analysis reveals that financial 
institutions do continue to provide capital to carbon intensive business models and have not 
yet evacuated their positions in the expectation of a carbon ‘bubble’ or ‘stranded assets’. We 
believe that it makes sense for financial institutions to maintain a steady and reliable supply 
of energy and energy intensive processed raw materials to downstream activities.  This is 
because the capital invested by financial institutions spans a more complex interdependent 
physical and financial value chain. That is, downstream business models to the right in figure 
2, whilst less carbon intensive (but still carbon dependent) arte able to convert a relatively 
low dependency on carbon emissions into substantial financial leverage and market value 
added (MVA) for investors and pension funds.
Table 4: Capital stack in carbon intensive business models in S&P 313
 
Total capital employed in carbon 
intensive business models
Total capital employed in less 
carbon intensive business models
 $ trillion $ trillion
2008 1.2 8.4
2009 1.3 8.9
2010 1.5 9.4
2011 1.6 9.5
2012 1.7 9.8
2013 1.8 10.4
2014 1.9 10.4
Change 0.7 2.0
Source: Thomson Reuters and author datasets
In the S&P 313 group of companies the digital lifestyle business model (DLBM) includes all 
companies that are involved in the provision of hardware, software applications and internet 
facilitation services. This broadly defined business model contains a group of companies that 
had a market value of roughly $1 trillion in 2006 and roughly equivalent to the S&P 500 energy 
utility business model (see chart 3). By the year 2014 the market value of companies 
contained in the DLBM had increased to $3.5 trillion whilst the market value of companies in 
the energy business model remained at 2006 levels of roughly $1 trillion. Although the DLBM 
only accounts for an average and steady 2.6 percent of the S&P 313 total carbon emissions 
over the period 2008 to 2014 its share of total S&P 500 market value increased from 6 to 18 
percent.
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Source: Thomson Reuters and Author datasets
The implications of this analysis are that downstream high value business models require 
inputs in the form of energy and materials that have been extracted and/or processed by 
business models that embody high levels of carbon emissions but represent a relatively low 
level of value at risk both in terms of the share capital employed and market value of the S&P 
313 group. The physical-financial interdependency between upstream and downstream 
business models complicates matters. A disturbance to energy supply or raw material 
processing capacity could arise if financial institutions redirected their capital stacks in a 
disorderly way. If such a disorganised exit from carbon intensive upstream business models 
were to take place this would have ramifications for downstream business models which 
generate significant financial leverage from their relatively low physical carbon dependency. 
Financial institutions are managing investment portfolios that overlap a range of business 
models ranging from those that are high carbon generators but capital light to those that are 
less carbon dependent but generate higher financial returns on capital. The conclusion we 
come to from this analysis is that financial institutions should be encouraged to maintain 
investment in carbon intensive business models but fund innovation(s) and infrastructure to 
reduce carbon emissions from energy and materials processing business models. For 
example, investing in energy efficiency; smart electricity distribution systems; CO2 capture 
utilization and disposal; energy storage and conservation, especially batteries; and increasing 
the uptake of CO2 by the terrestrial biosphere. This is essential because financial institutions 
need to, on the one hand, secure the flow of energy and processed materials to business 
models further downstream that can deliver the financial leverage necessary to underwrite 
pension funds.    
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3. Policy implications and discussions
There has been a shift in emphasis regarding the policy interventions for moderating the 
impact of climate change since the Kyoto agreement was signed in 1997. A top down legalistic 
and regulatory approach is no longer politically practical given the resistance emerging in 
America at a federal level to reducing carbon emissions and mitigating climate change.  The 
alternative now being adopted by global institutions such as WRI-UNEP and the European 
Commission is to consider how financial markets and institutional could modify corporate 
behaviour.  That is, establish carbon cap and trade markets that set a floor above which 
carbon emissions cannot increase and trade surplus and deficit credits in a market and/or 
encourage institutional investors to allocate capital away from carbon intensive business 
models.
 
Given the practical difficulty of establishing cap and trade markets for carbon emissions and 
also the fact that global carbon emissions have continued to rise. We propose that financial 
institutions engage, as global governing institutions, directly in different business models to 
influence how capital (both debt and equity) is allocated to reduce carbon intensity. Using the 
S&P313 group of companies we develop a framework of analysis that locates companies into 
broadly defined business models (Haslam et al., 2014). The objective is to reveal the extent 
to which financial institutions are evacuating from carbon intensive business models in terms 
of their debt and shareholder equity positions. We find that financial institutions continue to 
invest capital into carbon intensive business models but that this investment is not reducing 
carbon emissions. That is, financial institutions although increasing their financial 
commitment to carbon intensive business model are, either not engaging with companies to 
ensure that capital is committed to innovations that reduce carbon emissions or, are not 
tracking the carbon emissions embedded in their investment portfolios (see also European 
Commission, 2017b).   
A second purpose of our analysis reveals the complexity embedded in the physical and 
financial relationships that exist between business models within a value chain. We find that 
upstream business models are high carbon generating but operating with a relatively low 
share of capital employed. Downstream business models that are dependent upon energy 
and processed raw materials are less carbon intensive in terms of their share of overall carbon 
emissions but account for a substantial proportion of the S&P500 capital stack (debt and 
equity). For example the digital lifestyle business model accounts for roughly 2-3 percent of 
S&P313 carbon emissions but 18 percent of S&P 500 market value in 2014. These carbon light 
but financially leveraged business models depend upon a secure supply of energy and 
processed materials from upstream carbon intensive business models. 
Financial institutions cannot easily evacuate from carbon intensive business models because 
there is a lock-in effect because physical outputs from these business models are inputs into 
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high value creating downstream business models. There is an opportunity for financial 
institutions to take a more holistic approach to their portfolios one that recognises and 
incorporates this physical-financial interdependency into their decision making. This would 
involve investors providing finance that is guided by a combined social and economic 
imperative: sustainable decarbonised growth and stability in asset pricing. The first of these 
would involve financial institutions taking responsibility for funding society’s long-term needs 
for innovation and infrastructure that enables a reduction in carbon emissions from carbon 
intensive business models. The second imperative is that financial institutions secure financial 
stability by taking a more holistic view of their investment portfolios that comingle carbon 
generating and carbon dependent business models that are not mutually exclusive but 
physically and financially interdependent.
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